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Abstract
Is China a Superpower? Will it become one? After half a century of establishing a strong international military
presence, thriving economic growth, domestic/international political authority, and considerable cultural “soft
power”, the PRC has emerged as a hegemon capable of competing in international geopolitics. Nevertheless, these
questions remain unanswered. For this reason, this research explores what it means to be a superpower, whether
China is or will be a superpower, and, importantly, what impact China’s rise has on the world. To do this, this
research explores existing debates surrounding China’s current global status, the historical emergence of the PRC as
a major international power, and, lastly, analyzes China’s implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative within
Latin America, which is the quintessential representation of China’s continuing emergence as a 21st-Century
superpower. Crucially, this research centers four axes of power—military, economic, political, and cultural power—
around China’s historic memory of the “Century of Humiliation” to explain how and why Chinese leaders make the
decisions they do.

Introduction
Napoleon Bonaparte once compared China to a “sleeping lion” and observed that “when
she wakes, she will shake the world.” Now China the lion has awakened, but it is a
peaceful, amicable and civilized lion. - Xi Jinping, Chinese President1
In this world of ours, a world of powerful centers and subjugated outposts, there is no
wealth that must not be held in some suspicion. - Eduardo Hughes Galeano, Uruguayan
Journalist2
How can we understand the world? Our conventional understandings are often limited by
language, metaphor, and incomplete knowledge. Indeed, we often describe the world with
problematic or limiting language; Civilization, the West, the First, Second, and Third Worlds,
and, the Global South are all terms created to help us better describe the economic and political
position of peoples and states, but each carries a connotation that generalizes or systematizes
bias and prejudice. Metaphors likewise misconstrue our understanding of the world. After
making the remark quoted above, President Xi faced international backlash that capitalized on a
rhetorical weakness of his metaphor—“Who has ever seen a peaceful lion?”—and raised
concerns about China’s rise.3 Although unintentional, Xi’s metaphor distorted perspectives of

1

Xi Jinping, "Speech by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Meeting
Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of China-France Diplomatic Relations" (2014), Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, at
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1147894.shtml.
2
Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent (London: Profile
Books, 2009), pp. 267.
3
Interestingly, it is unclear that Napoleon ever even said this. Isaac Stone Fish, “Crouching Tiger, Sleeping Giant,”
Foreign Policy (blog), accessed July 17, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/19/china_shakes_the_world_cliche/.
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China’s foreign policy for the worse. Other famous metaphors—Clash of Civilizations, Axis of
Evil, Iron Curtain—have similarly distorted perceptions of international relations through
oversimplification. Even when our understanding of the world is minimally distorted, it is
incomplete: knowing the inner workings of anything in its entirety is impossible. This means
that all fields which seek to empirically describe our world—science, history, international
relations—are using incomplete observations to make incomplete descriptions. These
limitations are important to keep in mind when approaching any subject so as to avoid
oversimplification and reductionism.
Unfortunately, the field of international relations is marred with examples of this same
oversimplification and reductionism. Scholars are often tempted to overzealously describe a
fast-approaching “Clash of Civilizations” or a utopian “End of History.”4 While these examples
may seem hyperbolic, this theatrical rhetoric has similarly characterized the discourse
surrounding China’s rise in the 21st Century: whether “Sleeping Giant”, “Dragon in the Room”,
or “Paper Tiger”, scholars have not hesitated to refer to China as the opponent to the United
States in the “New Cold War.”5 However enticing these eye-catching titles may be, it is
important for scholarship to distance itself from rhetorical devices in order to more accurately
describe the world.
For that reason, this research attempts to address a less sweeping argument by focusing
on whether China has or will become a superpower. It does so by exploring China’s historic rise
since 1949, assessing the current debate surrounding China’s superpower status, and analyzing
China’s impact on the world, superpower or not. Crucially, this research distinguishes four axes

4

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order (London: Simon & Schuster,
2002). Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 2012).
5
Robert D. Kaplan, “A New Cold War Has Begun,” Foreign Policy (blog), accessed July 17, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/.
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of power—military, economic, political, and cultural power—and connects each of these to
China’s historical memory of the “Century of Humiliation” to explain how and why Chinese
leaders make the decisions they do. Ultimately, it becomes clear that after half a century of
establishing a strong international military presence, thriving economic growth,
domestic/international political authority, and a growing cultural “soft” power, China has
reemerged as a hegemon capable of competing in international geopolitics.6 Indeed, China now
challenges the once “unipolar” power (the United States) in its own historic “backyard” (Latin
America) through the Belt and Road Initiative, which is China’s comprehensive, global
investment and infrastructure program. In this way, China’s implementation of the Belt and Road
Initiative within Latin America is the quintessential representation of China’s continuing
emergence as a 21st-Century superpower. Indeed, China claims this rise in the world will be
beneficial for all.7 However, when assessing the intentions of the Belt and Road Initiative, the
words Eduardo Hughes Galeano—“there is no wealth that must not be held in some suspicion”—
should be remembered.8 Accordingly, this research evaluates the impact China’s Belt and Road
Initiative has on the environment and social issues in Latin America, concluding that Chinese
practices of predatory lending and neocolonialism threaten to exacerbate some of Latin
America’s greatest on-going issues.

What is a Superpower?
Before determining whether China is a superpower, the term “superpower” should be
clearly defined. Competing theories of international relations define superpower rather

6

Prior to the Century of Humiliation, China was undoubtedly a global power. Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, "What
Consensus? Geopolitics and Policy Paradigms in China and the United States," International Affairs 91, no. 1
(2015), pp. 94.
7
Xi Jinping, “Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,”
(2017) at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm.
8
Galeano, pp. 267.
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differently. For instance, realist John J. Mearsheimer, a renowned international relations scholar
from the University of Chicago, focuses on material power. He suggests that states’ levels of
power “are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability.”9
Correspondingly, regional hegemony—the military domination of a geographic region—belongs
to the state that can field the most powerful economy and military (the former is necessary to
maintain the latter). Mearsheimer argues that while there could theoretically be a global
hegemon, vast bodies of water inhibit regional hegemons from dominating other regions, making
global dominance unlikely.10 While Mearsheimer makes a convincing argument that material
power (i.e. military and economic power) is essential for a great power to become a hegemon,
his definition of hegemony falls short of describing crucial aspects of a superpower. Namely, he
minimizes the role of a state’s ability to exert political and cultural influence over states outside
its region. This ability is essential for any superpower.
Other scholars agree, similarly rejecting the view that a state is powerful merely because
of its ability to fund and flex military might. Neoliberal institutionalist scholars, for example,
suggest that states must also exhibit political control over international institutions in order to
become a dominant power. G. John Ikenberry, neoliberal institutionalist from Princeton
University, writes that a superpower is a state that “can create and enforce the rules and
institutions of a stable global order in which to pursue its interests and security.”11 Essentially,
leadership positions in international financial institutions (IFIs), the United Nations, or various
regional security organizations (e.g. NATO) strengthen a state’s ability to both coerce and co-opt

9

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 5.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 40-42.
11
John G. Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs, September 15, 2015,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west.
10

Bullock 5
other states into its political agenda.12 For instance, if a state has a seat on the International
Monetary Fund, it has the ability to influence that IFI’s actions so that they better align with that
state’s goals. Similarly, if a state is a part of a regional security organization like NATO, it can
potentially co-opt other nations into supporting its military interests. While participation in an
institution empowers a state, Ikenberry argues that a state can only be a superpower if these
institutions are in accordance with its own values and ideology.13
This institutional, political power is not sufficient for a state to become a superpower,
however: a state needs to have an international cultural influence too. This cultural influencing is
a part of what American political scientist and former Clinton administration official Joseph S.
Nye has labeled “Soft Power,” or “getting others to want the outcomes that you want.” Nye goes
on to break cultural influencing down into components, including “the attractiveness of a
country’s culture, political ideas, and policies” among other state’s and their populations.14
Neoliberal institutionalists support a similar view, noting the significance of socialization, which
“enables the hegemon to get others to acquiesce without the use of coercive power.”15 This
definition of power pushes beyond Mearsheimer’s material definition and better reflects the
complex type of influence a state must have to become a superpower. For instance, speaking to
political ideas, the globalization of American popular culture projects political values and ideas
(e.g. democracy) that may be enticing to foreign audiences. According to Nye, this dissemination
of political values gives the superpower more co-optive (rather than coercive) power, allowing it

12

Brian Schmidt, “Hegemony: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis,” Dialogue of Civilizations Research
Institute, accessed June 24, 2019, https://doc-research.org/2018/08/hegemony-conceptual-theoretical-analysis/.
13
Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West.”
14
Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2012, pp. x.
15
Schmidt, “Hegemony: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis.”
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to attract other states into supporting its global agenda.16 Convincing leaders and publics that the
superpower’s way of life is valuable by disseminating cultural practices (i.e. customs) is also a
source of soft power that can win a state allies. Meanwhile, the foreign and domestic policies of
a superpower can give it “soft power” as well, and Nye cites cases in which policies have made
states allies and enemies.17 These components, political ideas, culture, policies, and (as
mentioned above) institutional influence, comprise the cultural, soft power vital to a superpower.
Constructivists likewise believe in the importance of cultural power, but they argue
neoliberal institutionalists misattribute the target of this power. For instance, while neoliberal
institutionalists do include the public in their considerations, constructivist scholars like Ted
Hopf, an academic from the National University of Singapore, argue that neoliberal
institutionalists focus too much on the politics of the elite. Accordingly, constructivists believe
that existing literature fails to consider “mass public common sense, not just elite ideologies.”18
This means that “Soft Power” cannot come solely from political elites adopting a foreign
ideology or political system (e.g. democracy). Instead, if the superpower is to gain cultural power
from that state, the broader public must adopt the cultural values that support that ideology or
political system. Hopf essentially argues that “hegemonic power is maximized to the extent that
these ideas become taken for granted by the dominated population.”19 Noting the role of the
public and institutions that disseminate culture (even when that effect is auxiliary) better
scaffolds the cultural element of being a superpower.

16

Importantly, although a government’s ability to control soft power is limited, “that does not diminish its
importance”: a state can still encourage or assist the spread of its culture through policy. Nye, Soft Power: The
Means to Success in World Politics, pp. 8.
17
For example, American support for human rights in Argentina during the 1980s aided the United States once the
politically persecuted Peronists came to power. Conversely, African nations criticized American racial segregation
in the 1950s. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, pp. 13.
18
Ted Hopf, “Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics,” International Organization 67,
no. 2 (April 2013): 317–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000040.
19
Hopf, “Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics.”
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Which school of thought best captures the meaning of a superpower? In reality, whether
the school downplays material power or non-material powers, each has its faults. For this reason,
in order to balance the strengths and weaknesses of each school’s focus, a critical definition of a
superpower should be synthesized from these competing schools of thought. While this means
balancing many components, such a synthesis is obtainable. For instance, Alice Lyman Miller, a
scholar of the Hoover Institute, already argues that “the basic components of superpower stature
may be measured along four axes of power: military, economic, political, and cultural.”20 This
simple statement roughly comprises the same power components noted by realists, neoliberal
institutionalists, and constructivists alike. In fact, as I maintain throughout this work, a
superpower is a state that is regionally dominant and globally influential in all four axes of
power. This definition synthesizes the military, economic, political, and cultural perspectives of
realists, neoliberal institutionalists, and constructivists while retaining Mearsheimer’s core realist
belief that the state must be “so powerful that it dominates all the other states in [its regional]
system.”21 Crucially, this definition extends Mearsheimer’s concept of a regional hegemon. To
be a superpower, a dominant regional power must be able to influence external systems not just
through military and economic power, but also through political and cultural power. This
qualifies the regional power as a superpower, even if it cannot be completely dominant in the
global system.

Is China a Superpower?

20

As shown above in the discussion of the public’s role in cultural power, it is important to note that all of these
axes have their own quirks and complexities in both measurement and significance. For example, a country’s
economic power can be measured in relation to its GDP share, its level of industrialization, or even its population
size, making the term “economic power” relatively vague. Despite the amorphous nature of each axis, they
nonetheless comprise the basis of a state’s power. Alice Lyman Miller, “SJIR: China an Emerging Superpower?,”
Stanford Journal of International Relations, accessed May 6, 2019,
https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html.
21
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 40.
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Now, with a clear definition laid out, we can return to the original question: Is China a
superpower? Although there is an overwhelming consensus that China’s growth over the past
half a century has been incredible, there is much debate as to whether China is on its way to
becoming a superpower. In hope of better answering this question, the following sections attempt
to assess whether China is “so powerful that it dominates all the other states in [its regional]
system” through Miller’s military, economic, political, and cultural axes of power.22 The first
section contextualizes China’s historical rise and evaluates to what extent China has worked to
strengthen each axis of power. The subsequent section explores current scholarship surrounding
the china-as-superpower debate, which (interestingly) has already self-compartmentalized itself
into these four categories of power. The final section takes a stance in this debate, ultimately
arguing that despite the great ambivalence surrounding its rise to power, China seems capable of
overcoming the existing structural hurdles of each axis, specifically because of the Belt and Road
Initiative. This not only means that there is a great chance that China will become a superpower,
but also that China may increasingly influence every region of the world.
China’s Rise
While the full history of what Chinese historians call “The Century of Humiliation”
cannot be described here, it is important to contextualize the People’s Republic of China’s
starting point and note how that history has impacted the choices of its leaders and its path
towards strengthening the four axes of power. Beginning in 1842 with the Opium Wars, the
century of humiliation marks a period from 1842-1949 in which China was subject to repeated
military defeats and economic exploitation at the hands of European, American, and Japanese
forces. Significant brutality inflicted upon the Chinese people and their culture defined this

22

Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 40.
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period. Whether committed by outsiders—the 1860 destruction of the Summer Palace and the
1938 Nanjing Massacre are important examples—or by insiders—Jiang Jieshi’s (Chiang Kaishek’s) brutality during the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949) is well documented—the violence of
the century plagued China for generations.23 Because of this chaotic time, the future of the
country was uncertain when the Communist Party emerged from the “Century of Humiliation” in
1949. Indeed, the traumatic historical memory of the past century continues to weigh on Chinese
politicians, intellectuals, and people today.24 Nevertheless, the fledgling Communist party
managed to establish a relatively stable political system and regain control over most of the
Qing’s former land acquisitions.25 Even more impressively, over the course of the following 70
years, the People’s Republic of China emerged from this humbled position as one of the most
important actors in geopolitics. How?
The following sections explore how China strengthened each major axis of power since
1949. Each section focuses on its respective element of power (e.g. economy) and how the
historic memory of national humiliation shaped the changes within each axis. While it may seem
bold to claim that the strengthening of China’s axes is driven by historical memory, historical
memory has a crucial influence on how decisions are made by state’s and their leaders. As Zheng
Wang, a professor of international relations at Seton Hall University, writes, “historical memory
is the prime ‘raw material’ for constructing ethnicity and national identity,” which, consequently,
impacts the national interests and actions of a country.26 Indeed, in strengthening each axis, the

23

David Scott, China and the International System, 1840-1949 : Power, Presence, and Perceptions in a Century of
Humiliation, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), 2008, pp. x.
http://spectacled.ursinus.edu:3035/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=256905&site=ehost-live.
24
Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations,
Contemporary Asia in the World (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 221-222.
25
This is with the large exceptions of modern-day Mongolia and Taiwan. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for
Modern China, vol. 3 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013), pp. 470.
26
Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, pp. 7.
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historical memory of national humiliation has guided the decisions of China’s leaders, resulting
in an impressive yet qualified rise to international power. Moreover, the persistence of this
historical memory suggests that Chinese leaders will continue to push China towards becoming a
superpower.
Military
One source of modern China’s rise is its powerful military, which has its origins in the
end of the Chinese Civil War. After the near defeat of the Nationalists (or KMT) in 1949, the
military leaders of the Chinese Communist Party emerged as battle-hardened veterans tasked
with converting the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a guerilla force into a national army.
These men, like Peng Dehuai, were professional military elites who, although highly integrated
with the party, usually were focused on strategic rather than political success.27 Accordingly,
after emerging from the conflict of 1949, the PLA’s primary objectives were to establish a
modern, capable military, and to restore the territory China lost following the collapse of the
Qing dynasty.28 These goals were existentially driven by China’s determination to assuage the
historic trauma of national humiliation by facilitating a dramatic strengthening in its military
capabilities.29
The first goal, modernization, began with the Korean War (1950-1953). Tactically
speaking, during the Chinese Civil War, the PLA had relied on waging the “People’s War”. This
essentially meant the PLA used a combination of guerrilla tactics and overwhelming numbers to

27

Although technically a military leader, Mao was hardly a professional or technically skilled strategist. Dennis J.
Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," in A Military History of China, edited by Graff David A.
and Higham Robin, 249-50. University Press of Kentucky, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jcqw6.20.
28
Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 251; Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 471.
29
Importantly, attempts to assuage this historical memory “have, at times, served to activate, not assuage, people’s
historical memory of past humiliation.” Thus, despite leaders’ intentions, policies can revitalize a feeling of national
humiliation rather than assuage it. Wang, Zheng. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese
Politics and Foreign Relations, pp. 11.

Bullock 11
make up for its dated equipment and limited training.30 While these tactics proved effective in
driving out the Japanese in the Second World War and the KMT during the Chinese Civil War,
the warfare of the Korean War—in which Chinese soldiers would confront UN forces on
unfamiliar, open land—made this type of fighting more difficult. Moreover, the UN forces had
dramatically superior technology compared to the PLA.31 For this reason, although Peng Dehuai
was successful in driving back the UN forces, the Chinese faced massive casualties, potentially
reaching over a million.32 Thus, although the Korean War can certainly be noted as a victory for
China—the once “humiliated” nation was able to drive back a coalition of Western powers—
waging such a costly war was not sustainable, and PLA leaders noted the imperative need to
modernize if China’s military was going to stand a fighting chance on the international stage.
To overcome this technological and strategic deficit, the PLA’s leaders turned to the
Soviet Union for equipment and expertise.33 With an initial loan of around $300 million, the
PLA adopted Soviet military structures, trained with Soviet weapons and vehicles, and
established domestic military factories.34 These developments fueled the modernization of
Chinese conventional military power. Even after Mao initiated a demobilization of millions of
PLA troops, the PLA remained an over-two-million-strong fighting force trained with Soviet

30

Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 250.
This situation was historically familiar to the Chinese. At the outbreak of the Opium War, Lin Zexu, a
commissioner tasked with quelling the opium trade, described the superiority of British cannons, writing “Our
technology was backward. Many of our generals and soldiers were experienced servicemen, but a battle like this in
which the two sides engaged in a war without seeing each other, that was what they have never experienced before.”
Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 251; Jiang Tingfu, Zhongguo jinsaishi [Modern
History of China]. (Changsha: Shangwu) 1938, Reprint, Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2001, pp. 17.
32
While the PRC’s estimate was never released, some suggest that loses reached nearly a million. More
conservative estimates favor 600,000. Regardless, the war was costly. Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp.
475-476.
33
Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 251.
34
Prior to this the Chinese navy and airforce had been made out of stolen and salvaged Japanese fighters and
Nationalist warships. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 2nd Edition: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First
Century. Vol. 2nd ed. (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press) 2010, pp. 8.
31
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weaponry.35 Post-world-war modernization meant more than advanced conventional troops,
however. Indeed, the Korean War had only ended in the face of President Eisenhower’s nuclear
“diplomacy” in 1953, causing the Chinese government to recognize the nuclear weapons had
changed the face of warfare and that any nation seeking a modern military needed a nuclear
weapon.36 This lesson only became clearer as Eisenhower continued to use nuclear threats during
the ensuing Taiwan crises in 1954 and 1958.37 Consequently, again with the aid of Soviet
technology, training, and scientists, the PRC began pursuing the development of a nuclear
weapon. While development of an atomic weapon was delayed during the Sino-Soviet split,
China nonetheless entered the “Nuclear Club” in 1964 after its first successful detonation. This
development is crucial in China’s military history not only because it reflects the PLA’s general
shift towards modernization, but also because it marks China’s growing desire to be independent
of both Soviet and American influence. Nuclear technology continued to advance in the
following decades, and China proceeded to develop hydrogen bombs, nuclear submarines, and
nuclear warheads.38
These modernizing developments were driven by the need to assuage the historic
memory of national humiliation, a sentiment which is well reflected in the leaders of the PLA.
The words of Lin Biao, for instance, appeared in The People’s Daily in 1965, praising the glory
of the “People’s War” and its victory over Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).
Lin argued that international politics was characterized by a “fierce struggle between the people
of the world on one side and U.S. imperialism and its lackeys on the other.”39 Ultimately, the

35

Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 500.
Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 475, 494.
37
Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 252.
38
Blasko, "Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989," pp. 252-254.
39
Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!,” accessed July 8, 2019,
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/ch08.htm.
36
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underlying belief in Lin Biao’s writing is imperialists, especially the United States, will always
attempt to humiliate weaker states. Although the era of “ping-pong” diplomacy and Nixon’s visit
to China would cool this relationship, the United States remained the primary imperial antagonist
in the eyes of the Chinese public, even after border conflicts with India and the Soviet Union
ensued. This was well reflected not just by the rhetoric of elites, but of the choices of everyday
Chinese people during the Cultural Revolution. Americans remaining in the country during the
Cultural Revolution were detained as spies, effigies of Uncle Sam were burned, and students
attacked officials who had any previous connection with the United States.40 Such cultural
rejections carried on into the 1990s, when Chinese intellectuals vehemently responded to
American intellectuals such as Samuel Huntington who painted China as a threat to America.
Books like China Can Say No reflected the persistent urge to reject American authority and
culture.41
While this popular rejection of all things American may seem tangentially related to
military action, the connection is strong. This is because “historical memory often serves as a
major motivating factor in international conflict, especially when the confrontation is perceived
by the Chinese as an assault on the nation’s fundamental identity.”42 Running through just a few
examples chronologically, this connection becomes clearer. During the Korean War, for
example, the PLA’s high demand for grain, meat, and cotton drew resources away the general
Chinese population, which was still reeling from the destruction of the Second World and Civil

40

David L. Shambaugh, “Anti-Americanism in China” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 497 (1988), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1045767, pp. 148.
41
Klaus Mühlhahn, Making China Modern: From the Great Qing to Xi Jinping, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press), 2019, pp. 545-546.
42
Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations
pp. 15.
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War.43 In order to maintain popular support for the war despite the hardships it induced, the CCP
launched massive anti-American propaganda campaigns. These campaigns focused on the need
to ward off American Imperialism and avoid the same humiliation from which China had just
escaped.44 Similarly, during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government used
America as a scapegoat to justify violent, military suppressions of the population.45 Lastly, in the
1990s, surges of nationalism that rejected American media portrayal of China most likely
influenced the government's decision to lay claims on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. 46 Indeed,
these popular nationalist movements, like the government-driven campaigns before them, had
the goal of emboldening and justifying military action in the name of avenging the nation’s
previous suffering. In sum, the modernization of China’s military was existentially driven by the
desire to shake off the “Century of Humiliation.”
As with modernization, national humiliation drove the PLA’s campaign to restore various
territories lost during the Qing dynasty. These territories originally included Tibet, Taiwan,
Mongolia, and various islands and waterways in the East and South China Seas. While China
was able to obtain control over some of these territories and waterways, the United States
continually thwarted important acquisitions, further establishing the United States main
antagonist for the PRC. In Tibet, for example, the PLA had subdued most local resistance by
1950, but as late as 1959 the CIA trained Tibetan rebels to act as insurgents and resist PRC
authority.47 While in Tibet’s case the United States only managed to make China’s territorial
authority less stable, the United States completely negated Chinese attempts to retake Taiwan by

Mühlhahn, Making China Modern: From the Great Qing to Xi Jinping, pp., 379.
Andrew Kuech, “The Dangerous Reprise of Chinese Korean War Propaganda,” in The Diplomat, accessed July
10, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/the-dangerous-reprise-of-chinese-korean-war-propaganda/.
45
Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 549-550.
46
Mühlhahn, Making China Modern: From the Great Qing to Xi Jinping, pp. 544-546.
47
Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 527.
43
44
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sending its Seventh Fleet to patrol the Strait of Formosa in 1950.48 Similarly, the United States
had planted “nuclear-capable Matador surface-to-surface missiles on Taiwan,” putting American
nuclear weapons on China’s doorstep and rendering an assault on the island strategically
impossible.49 Other territories remained outside of China’s grasp for other reasons. The most
important example of this is Mongolia, which became an independent republic in the 1950s.
Although Mao had made numerous claims that Mongolia would once again become a part of
China, the Soviet Union ensured Mongolia would retain its independence (within the Soviet
sphere of influence).50
In relation to maritime territory, China was able to periodically retake many of the islands
controlled by the Guomindang off the coast of Taiwan, but was relatively unsuccessful in
reclaiming disputed territories in the East and South China Seas.51 In the East China Sea, China
looked to regain the Diaoyu/Senkakus islands, and, in the South China Sea, the Prata and Spratly
Islands, all of which had been lost to Japan in either the Sino-Japonese war (Diaoyu/Senkakus)
or Second World War (Prata and Spratly). Reclaiming these islands and all other islands bound
between the “nine dash line”—an arbitrary line drawn around the South China Sea by the
Guomindang and later adopted by the PRC—became a clear policy goal in 1953. Nevertheless,
little action is taken by the Chinese government in relation to these islands until 1970
(conveniently the year after it was reported that there was most likely large deposits of oil in the
South China Sea), when it begins to make claims on the Diaoyu Islands and forcibly occupies the
Paracel Islands, the latter of which were owned by Vietnam.52 Conflict over these islands would
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continue to escalate, and China to this day makes claims over the area bound within the “nine
dash line.” The desire to restore maritime control was similarly driven by the need to ausuage
national humiliation, and, in 1997, the Chinese Government’s formal acquisition of Hong
Kong—a crucial maritime port and symbol of national humiliation—marked another point in
which the Chinese leaders believed they were “wiping out the century-old humiliation caused by
its occupation.”53 Thus, as China expands its military power into the South China Sea, it
continues to invoke the rhetoric of national humiliation.
How have these historical developments strengthened China’s military axis of power?
From it modernization standpoint, the strengthening is relatively obvious: the PLA began as a
guerrilla army in the 1930s and 1940s and emerged as a nuclear power with advanced weaponry
and tactics by the turn of the century. In relation to territorial acquisitions, China’s forceful
occupation of various lands has facilitated numerous success—easier access to oil in the South
China Sea, more comprehensive trade routes through western China, etc. Indeed, even the
background presence of the need to push against humiliation has strengthened China’s military
power, enabling its aggressive, outright rejections of American authority. With these historical
developments in mind, China’s military rise is evident.
Economy
Running parallel and intertwined with military strengthening is China’s international rise
as a formidable economic force. While many people of China suffered horribly under Maoist
economic reforms—20 million people are estimated to have died as a result of a famine caused
by the Great Leap Forward—many of his earlier reforms kick-started the transition from an
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agrarian economy to an industrial economy.54 By both extending and revising Mao’s policies, the
PRC leaders that came to power following his death brought extensive changes to the structure
of the Chinese economy. Deng Xiaoping, in particular, championed the economic reforms that
laid the groundwork for China’s rapid economic growth and its continuing economic problems.
Specifically, China’s opening as a global market combined with its shift from an agrarian to an
industrial economy facilitated China’s rapid growth. Conversely, demographic imbalances and
environmental degradation proved to be persistent hurdles to China’s economic independence
and stability. Importantly, like its impressive military growth, China’s economic miracle was
driven by a desire to leave its “backwardness” (a source of its national humiliation) in the past.
Speaking first to China’s shift to an industrial economy, it was actually the economic
reforms under Mao Zedong, not Deng Xiaoping, that pulled China’s agrarian workers into an
industrial labor force. During Mao’s reign over the PRC (1949-1976), industrial output increased
more than 30-fold, the urban proletariat grew to 18 million (originally 3 million), and China
slowly began to produce heavy tractors, railway locomotives, and other important infrastructure
technology.55 While this industrial revolution came at a heavy price (namely in human lives) and
had uneven success (“backyard” furnaces produced extremely low quality steal), the push for
industry under Mao kicked-off China’s mission to become the world’s factory. For Mao, these
reforms were meant “to make [their] economically and culturally backward country a prosperous
and powerful one” (Emphasis added).56 Although Mao saw China as a great nation with the
ability to become powerful, he believed that China’s economy needed to modernize and
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industrialize before that could happen. Accordingly, the historic memory of national humiliation
makes an appearance through the word “backwards” in Mao’s language. Mao, like the Qing
scholars of the “Self-Strengthening” movement, believed that China succumbed to imperial
powers because of its antiquated economic practices (basically, agrarianism) and that only
through economic modernization could China escape humiliation.57
These reforms, however, threatened to exacerbate the already substantial issues created
by Mao’s reforms—overproduction, inefficient bureaucracy, etc.—and were quickly reverted by
Deng Xiaoping once he gained control over the CCP in 1978. Indeed, after the economic disaster
of Mao’s later economic plan, the Great Leap Forward, Deng Xiaoping attempted to backpedal
Mao’s reforms, calling for “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”58 From a pragmatic
perspective, this merely meant that China needed “to pursue the policy of opening up to the
outside world” economically and pursue free-market reforms. However, due to the persisting
euphoria surrounding Maoism, Deng reaffirmed that such reforms would fit within the
framework of Marxist-Leninist teleology: China would “advocate communism” but operate at
“the socialist stage… to develop the productive forces” of the economy. Ultimately, Deng’s goal
was to figure out “how China, which is still backward, is to develop the productive forces and
improve the people’s living standard.”59
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To do this, Deng and the leaders of the CCP continued the transition to an industrial
economy and opened up China to international investors. For instance, industrial reforms carried
out in urban centers from 1979-1980 decentralized capital and increased productivity. One way
in which this was done was through incentivizing light industry, since Maoist reforms had
created an imbalance of heavy industry. This allowed for more efficient production and higher
quality products since Chinese capital was more capable of producing light goods than products
like heavy steal.60 Additionally, the CCP turned to breaking the “iron rice bowl,” a Mao-era jobsecurity program that was deemed to create inefficiency and paternalistic dependence by the
party: “If a man does not come to work, cross his name off the payroll!”.61 To do this, reformers
empowered industrial bosses with the ability to punish or fire workers they found to be
underperforming.62 This empowering of individual enterprises was matched at the national level,
and factory managers increasingly gained the ability to operate in accordance with market (rather
than government) demands.63 Such reforms had limited success in urban centers, but rural
industry responded much more favorably to reforms, especially once township and village
enterprises (TVEs) were established. These small industrial conglomerates were owned mostly
by private owners or local governments, and their rapid success lead to further deregulation and
decollectivization in urban industry by 1984.64 Importantly, these reforms carried on after Deng
Xiaoping. During the 1990s, a stronger environment of healthy economic competition grew in
Chinese industrial centers, the hukou system (which restricted Chinese citizens from migrating
within the country) was relaxed to facilitate better movements of labor force, and tax reform
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strengthened the central government’s profit from domestic industry.65 Subsequently, the
extensive infrastructure projects of the 2000s better integrated the TVEs into China’s economy,
furthering China’s successful transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy.66
This transition was made possible by extensive external investments, which were an
outcome of China’s opening to foreign markets. These reforms are based framed in the words of
the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978: the CCP was now
“actively expanding economic cooperation on terms of equality and mutual benefit with other
countries on the basis of self-reliance.”67 Essentially, the leaders of the reform movement
recognized the importance of Chinese integration with the global economy to avoid
“backwardness”, and Deng’s own rhetoric expresses the lingering historic memory of national
humiliation. In a speech to the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in
1982, Deng said:
No foreign Country can expect China to be its vassal, nor can it expect China to accept anything harmful to
China’s interests. [China] will unswervingly follow a policy of opening to the outside world and actively
increase exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. 68

This distinct sentiment runs in parallel with a desire to assuage national humiliation and has
driven China’s cautious opening to investments and the global economy.
To balance this process of opening and independence, rather than open all of China to
foreign investment, reformers created the Special Economic Zones (SEZs).69 These four zones,
which were designated in parts of Guangdong and Fujian provinces in 1979, mimicked roles of
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Mühlhahn, Making China Modern: From the Great Qing to Xi Jinping, pp. 556.
67
“Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China,” in Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 2 (New York: Columbia Univ. Pr., 1999), pp. 489-490.
68
Deng Xiaoping, “Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC,” (1982) in Selected Works of
Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp 396.
69
Maurice J. Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism: 1978-1994, pp. 235.
65
66

Bullock 21
Canton and Macao during the Qing dynasty. Like those cities, each SEZ was a deregulated zone
in which domestic and foreign investment can flow relatively freely, functioning as controlled
enclaves in which China could participate in global trade. Importantly, unlike their predecessors,
these zones followed Chinese law, were managed by Chinese officials, and greatly benefited the
Chinese economy.70 In fact, the SEZs were so successful that were later complemented by the
CCP’s sweeping Coastal Development Strategy (CDS) in 1988, which further opened up China’s
industrial bases to foreign capital and investment.71 The SEZ in Shenzhen was perhaps the most
striking example of this success: its GDP increased from 4 million U.S. dollars in 1980 to 114.7
billion U.S. dollars in 2008.72
These “opening” reforms of the 1980s would carry into the 1990s, and reformers actually
doubled down on transitioning to a market economy. Much of this involved making investing in
China easier. For instance, China’s confusing dual-currency rate—one for foreigners and one for
Chinese companies—was reformed to create a more hospitable trading system. The two rates
were set at essentially equal levels, resulting in a devaluation of China's currency and a massive
uptick in foreign investments and exports.73 Similarly, in order to qualify as a member of the
World Trade Organization (which would greatly facilitate international China’s trade), stateowned enterprises and wages were reformed to increase productivity.74 When China became a
WTO member in 2001, it further opened to investment, but there are important limitations to this
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“opening”. First, China has often been criticized for not following all the WTO’s rules and
regulations. This has prevented China’s designation as a market economy, which would allow
China to continue to sell its low-cost goods without the threat of foreign protectionism.75
Additionally, China has required companies that want to do business within its borders relinquish
business secrets and advanced technology to Chinese companies prior.76 While this casts doubt
on the idea that China is “open” in the sense of a free-market, it certainly has aided the growth of
Chinese companies like Huawei, Alibaba, and Baidu.77 This historical opening at a measured
pace is likely to continue under President Xi Jinping, who claimed at The Belt and Road Forum
for International Cooperation in 2017, “opening up brings progress while isolation results in
backwardness.”78
China’s economic growth was not painless, however. Such rapid expansion brought new
demographic issues and environmental decay. Speaking to demographics, as China grew
tremendously in population and dramatically reshaped its economic structure, the demographic
imbalances between rural and urban populations increased. This is largely due to the CCP’s
official reinstatement of the hukou system in 1958. The hukou system was a household
registration system that divided China’s urban and rural workers by region that had existed in
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China for centuries and indeed is still used today.79 While this system has helped China’s
economy in many ways—namely it allowed the government to control the flow of labor and
guarantee a mixed agricultural/industrial economy—the inequality created by the hukou system
has started to take its toll on China’s economy. Large, extremely underpaid migrant populations
are revolting more frequently in urban centers, and rural populations are likewise destabilizing as
their land is acquiesced by local authorities in the name of urbanization.80 Worse yet,
unemployment is a growing concern for the country, which often relies on “bridge to nowhere”
infrastructure projects to create employment and maintain growth.81 While Chinese leaders are
aware of this growing danger to social stability, their attempts to remedy the issue have had
limited success. Realistically, the options of China’s leaders are limited: simple repeal of the
hukou system would likely result in a flood of migrants in coastal and urban zones,
overwhelming infrastructure, sanitation, and general order.82
Another self-invented demographic imbalance is gendered. Perhaps one of the CCP’s
most internationally infamous policies of the 20th Century was the One-Child Policy, in which
the government limited Chinese families to having one child per parental couple (with limited
exceptions).83 Initiated in 1980 with “the goal of holding the total population in [the] country
under 1.2 billion by the end of the century,” the policy led to a dramatic imbalance between
Chinese men and women, with the sex ration, defined as the proportion of male live births to
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female live births, reaching as high as 1.17 in 2001.84 Compared to industrialized countries,
which typically have a ratio of 1.03-1.07, this is a severe imbalance.85 This imbalance is largely a
result of a cultural devaluation of women, who are seen as less financially beneficial as
daughters. Indeed, mothers in China were often fearful of bearing daughters due to the intense
social stigma surrounding having a daughter instead of a son, especially in rural communities.86
Beyond compounding an already deteriorating situation for women in China—who were rapidly
being moved from classrooms to factories87—the overbalance of men presented (and continues
to present) a social challenge to China. This is because young, unmarried men, the population of
which is increasing in China, are more likely to act violently, commit crimes, and be generally
unlawful. While the Chinese government has recognized this issue and announced plans to
normalize the birth-sex ratio by 2010, it is unlikely that these reforms could reverse the
imbalance created by over thirty years of anti-daughter birthing practices.88 Although the social
issues created by rural and urban/gender imbalances may seem tangentially related to economic
stability, the two are closely related. As China’s demographic structure continues to promote
domestic unrest, the government will have to further divert funds towards damage control and
investors will become increasingly uncertain.
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China also has experienced rapid land degradation, water contamination, and air pollution
over the course of its industrialization, all of which further sap China’s economic progress and
persist as sizable economic hurdles. Realistically, many of these problems are in no way new to
China—China’s unsustainable agricultural practices were taking a toll on the environment as
early as the Han Dynasty—but China’s miraculous growth over the past seventy years have put
destructive processes into overdrive. For example, in relation to land degradation, the policies of
the Great Leap Forward, which focused almost entirely on industrialization and the exclusive
agricultural production of grain, irreparably damaged China’s soils and forests.89 While reforms
in the 1980s introduced more sustainable farming and industrial techniques and infrastructure
projects of the 21st century have limited historic flooding and energy shortages, mass
urbanization has severely damaged China’s potable water supply. In fact, the World Bank noted
in 2002 that China had just a quarter of the global average for freshwater per capita due to the
excess amounts of sewage and industrial dumping.90 Beyond water, perhaps the most visible
environmental problem for China is smog: carcinogens cause up to 1.6 million deaths in China
every year, 17 percent of the mortality rate.91 Combined, these pollutants siphon significant
growth from the Chinese economy—air pollutants alone cost China’s economy US $38 billion a
year—and threaten to destabilize the “output legitimacy” the CCP relies on.92
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Do these historical developments reflect China’s status as a superpower? As mentioned
before, demographic imbalances and environmental degradation proved to be persistent hurdles
to China’s economic independence and stability. Thus, in contrast with its military rise, the
strengthening of China’s economic axis of power has had mixed success. However, while
demographic imbalances and environmental degradation are clear troubles for China, for the
time being, its transformation into the “World Factory” and opening to global investment have
enabled its economic axis to become far stronger. China’s survival of the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis via massive stimulus spending reflects this strength, especially when compared to other
world powers caught up in the crisis.93 Nevertheless, China’s growth is not preordained. Whether
China’s economic axis will continue to become more powerful depends largely on the CCP’s
ability to evolve to address the complicated economic challenges of the 21st Century. Since the
11th Five Year Plan (2016-2021) specifically aims to address those challenges, it seems like
China can overcome the hurdles which restrain its growth. Regardless of the outcome, the
choices made by CCP leaders will certainly be driven by a desire to assuage national humiliation
and escape so-called “backwardness.”
Politics
Although military empowerment and economic growth were at the forefront of Chinese
policymakers’ minds, China’s political axis of power still changed dramatically during China’s
rise. In fact, China’s transformation into a major player in international politics has been
facilitated not just by economic and military growth, but by its entry into international
institutions. These institutions have paradoxically facilitated the empowerment of China’s
political axis of power through the formal allocation of voting rights (e.g. the United Nations
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Security Council) and, concurrently, limited its political axis by pushing China to conform to
Western practices (e.g. the World Trade Organization). Consequently, when Western institutions
proved too hostile, China has been willing to participate in international initiatives that attempt to
disassociate themselves from American and European spheres of influence (e.g. the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank). This mixed approach to international integration is ultimately
driven by China’s desire to avoid the same choices which caused the Century of Humiliation:
instead of attempting isolation and over relying on the outside world economically, China would
practice “self-reliance” and (cautious) integration.
While China did not practice isolation during the 1950s and 1960s—it held and
participated in various regional conferences like the Bandung Conference and The Asia-Pacific
Regional Meeting of the World Peace Council—China’s integration into international
institutions formally began with the United Nations in 1971.94 Since the end of the second world
war, the government in Taiwan, not mainland China, held one of the five United Nations
Security Council seats. Accordingly, the PRC advocated relentlessly for a position on the UNSC
by rallying other nonaligned voting nations. This process began in 1950 at the recommendation
of Soviet Union advisors, and, despite the United States’ strong resistance, China eventually
replaced Taiwan as the fifth permanent member of the Security Council via a two-thirds vote in
the General Assembly.95
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This was a pivotal change for two reasons. First, China was able to win over veto power
in the Security Council, which was supplied to each permanent member of the UNSC. While
China’s use of the veto has been historically limited, that institutional power has strengthened
China’s political axis greatly, allowing it to punish countries that oppose its mission or
sovereignty, as it did in 1999 against Macedonia for refusing to recognize Beijing as the capital
of China (as opposed to Taipei).96 Second, China’s ascension to the UNSC marked China’s first
entrance into institutions created by imperial powers as an equal. China’s ability to rise to this
level was credited to its successful “self-reliance” by domestic and foreign observers alike.
Domestically, the Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China stated that China was now actively establishing “cooperation
on terms of equality and mutual benefit with other countries on the basis of self-reliance.”97
Those terms, of course, stand in juxtaposition to the “cooperation” forced upon China during the
Opium War. In this way, “self-reliance” is closely linked with the historic memory of national
humiliation. Foreign observers likewise recognized China’s self-reliance. In 1981, the UN
Secretary-General made a toast to the Chinese Vice-Premier, stating: “Considering the
formidable difficulties which China has to face in this endeavour, the self-reliance which it has
shown is a source of inspiration to all.”98 Of course, it is likely that the Secretary-General picked
the term “self-reliance” very diplomatically, but that nonetheless reflects the importance of the
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phrase to his Chinese audience. At that point in 1981, it seemed as though China would be able
to balance self-reliance with the cautious integration that scaffolded its international political
goals.
As China became more entangled with international institutions and the global economy,
however, this balance became more difficult. This difficulty is best encapsulated by China’s
struggles to become admitted to and an accepted market economy of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Unlike the United Nations, admission into the WTO requires a state to
make significant policy changes. In China’s case, this meant developing economic liberalism and
stepping away from its trademark command economy. Initially, this was not much of a problem
for China. The country under Deng Xiaoping had already begun economic liberalization and
become a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund when, in 1986, CCP
announced its intent to rejoin the Generally Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the
precursor to the WTO).
However, as existing GATT members debated whether to admit a nation that barely met
the economic liberalization criteria, the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 brought
international condemnation upon the Chinese government and slowed negotiations.99
Consequently, it quickly became clear that China’s admission would be more difficult than it had
appeared originally. Indeed, even after the GATT was scraped and converted into the WTO in
1995, China was unable to establish itself as a founding member. The following years in which
China attempted to join the WTO involved grueling negotiations with the United States—which
could de facto veto any nation’s admittance into the WTO—amid consistently deteriorating
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political relations between the two nations.100 Nevertheless, China was eventually admitted to the
WTO in 2001. This was only possible, however, because China made various concessions and
reforms in order to conform with the Western, liberalized economic structure the WTO and, in
effect, the United States mandated.
While this lengthy process undoubtedly frustrated Chinese leaders (Chinese Premier Zhu
Rongji attempted to resign three times during the process), they were determined to reap the
maximum benefits of joining the WTO. This would be done, according to Chinese WTO
representative Shi Guangsheng, only if the WTO was “fully reflecting the interests and
requirements of all parties, including developing countries.”101 Jiang Zemin likewise emphasized
in a 2001 speech in Hong Kong:
Following its entry into the [WTO], China will steadily expand its opening-up program in terms of
commodity and services trade, create a level playing field for a fair and transparent competition between
Chinese and overseas enterprises, establish and improve a foreign trade regime that is consistent with
international practice and that suits China's own national conditions, and provide the overseas enterprises
with more and stable access to the Chinese market so as to facilitate economic cooperation and trade
between China and other countries.

This rhetoric highlights China’s desire to “expand its opening-up” while maintaining “a level
playing field” so as to avoid the disasters that occurred during the Century of Humiliation.
Importantly, this would all be done using the nation’s “strong sense of self- esteem, selfconfidence, self-reliance and self-improvement” (Emphasis added).102 Therefore, although China
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had to bend to extensive reforms in order to join the WTO, it would not allow those reforms to
subject it to a position of submission. Indeed, China’s on-going battles with the WTO over its
market economy status reflect this unwillingness to fully yield to Western economic
liberalism.103 Thus, while China seems willing to make concessions in order to strengthen its
political axis of power, it limits the influence of Western liberalization when possible.
Accordingly, China has often circumvented the bias of Western institutions like the WTO
by creating its own. These Chinese spearheaded institutions have empowered China politically as
a global leader and a regional hegemon. For instance, the New Development Bank (NDB) and
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both founded in 2014, are two Chinesedominated financial institutions created outside the sphere of Western influence (both have their
headquarters in China and the AIIB was conceived in China).104 These financial institutions,
which fund various global infrastructure projects and initiatives through loans, were created,
according to President Xi Jinping, to “help make the global economic governance system more
just, equitable and effective.”105 Clearly, by saying the AIIB and NDB would make the system
more just, President Xi necessarily implies that the current global economic governance system
as it stands is unjust. Both the NDB and AIIB have facilitated multilateral negotiations benefiting
China without requiring the extensive reforms mandated by the WTO or IMF.
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Indeed, it even seems increasingly possible that China will be able to reform the longstanding U.S. dominated financial institutions through the inside. One example is the World
Bank, where Chinese economist Justin Yifu Lin appointed chief economist from the years 20082012 and had extensive control over the banks mission.106 Similarly, although the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) has pushed back on China’s manipulation of the renminbi, China’s voting
share has increased beyond six percent in the past twenty years, giving it a major voice in all
decisions.107 While these development does not necessarily mean China is on its way to
supplanting institutions like the World Bank or IMF, China’s ability to champion financial
institutions outside the American system has certainly strengthened its political axis of power.
Whether this system counts as the “self-reliance” for which China’s leaders advocate is up for
debate. Regardless, by joining existing institutions, whether skewed in favor of Western powers
or not, China has become a major player in the international political arena: as nations continue
to join the AIIB and NDB, this power is only likely to grow.
Culture
In many ways, as China became more connected with the world politically and
economically, it developed channels through which it could broadcast its cultural influence.
Tracing this cultural projection is difficult, however. Much of China’s culture has been in flux
since 1949, resulting in inconsistent cultural messaging to the international community. Indeed,
recalling the components of cultural power Nye defines, which are “the attractiveness of a
country’s culture, political ideas, and policies,” China’s cultural axis has undergone extensive
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changes in the past seventy years.108 Correspondingly, this section traces the historical evolution
of China’s culture, political ideas, and policies. In addition, this section subsequently analyzes
how these three elements of cultural power have been received by the international community
and briefly previews the existing barriers to China’s cultural power.
Overall, in terms of political ideas, China went to great lengths under Mao to export
Communism. In contrast, China after Mao put comparatively less effort into exporting its central
political ideas, namely market authoritarianism (although the economy’s success has done much
to sell itself). In terms of policies, China’s history of human rights violations has wrought
critique, and its restrictions on personal freedoms have not made it any allies abroad. Lastly,
China has done very little to export that which is traditionally considered culture—“(a)
observable artifacts, (b) values, and (c) basic underlying assumptions,”—until recently in the
21st Century; however, the little it has done has been relatively successful.109 Like military,
economic, and political power, the (limited) rise of China’s culture power operated through the
lens of national humiliation.
After the success of the Communist Revolution in 1949, the political ideas disseminated
by China were entrenched in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist rhetoric. Chinese leaders, especially Mao,
advocated for other proletariat populations around the world to rise up and overthrow the
oppressive bourgeoisie and imperialist establishment. Mao’s famous “little red book” was read
not just all over in China, but all over the world, and quotations like “imperialism and all
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reactionaries… must be seen for what they are - paper tigers” quickly became famous.110 In fact,
Mao’s writing quickly became popular in a variety of countries, ranging from Peru to Tanzania
to India.111 While it is easy to note the popularity of Mao’s writing, this popularity does not
necessarily translate into the direct exportation of China’s political ideas. After all, Communism
had been around for over a century, and China was not its only champion: the Soviet Union had
laid claim to that mantle since 1917.
Indeed, between 1949 and the death of Mao in 1976, China was far more focused inward
than outward, and China relatively little to advocate its political model other than advocate for
revolution in other developing countries. This does come with the exception of the Bandung
Conference of 1955, in which Zhou Enlai, China’s foreign minister, worked with a coalition of
nations—India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Ceylon—to highlight the United States as the
main enemy of the continental coalition.112 Beyond assisting in the globalization of antiAmericanism, China worked to reaffirm the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” enshrined
in the Panchsheel Treaty of 1955: “(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal
affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.”113 China’s affirmation of
these principles served a dual purpose. First, Chinese leaders wanted to assure their neighbors
that their struggle against the First and Second world was unified and that China stood firmly as
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a member of the Third World determined to advocate for the end of imperialism. Second, it
internationally broadcasted the very issues that characterized China’s historic memory. Mostly,
“non-interference in each other's internal affairs” speaks directly to China’s concerns of foreign
nations meddling in China’s domestic realm as European powers had during the Century of
Humiliation. Nevertheless, beyond the Bandung Conference, China was largely focused inward,
and the crisis of the Great Leap Forward would only further divert China’s attention from
advocating for its political ideas abroad.
After the death of Mao, the turn inward quickly became a turn outward. As discussed
above, this “turning-out” was primarily an economic opening to global markets. With economic
opening, however, comes the spread of ideas, and the China of the late 1970s onwards was
advertising something very different from Maoism. China’s new model often branded by foreign
observers as “market authoritarianism” was now the selling point of China’s political ideas. This
market authoritarianism was defined by “the new alternative of ‘going capitalist and staying
autocratic,” and “Beijing has provided the world’s most compelling, high-speed demonstration
of how to liberalize economically without surrendering to liberal politics.”114 Essentially, China
represented an economic and political model that could rival that of the United States, a point
which had major “implications for China’s sense of identity and of national pride as policymakers and populace alike [sought] to expunge the stain of humiliation.”115
China would go on to find its largest audience in Africa in the 1970s. This is largely due
to African dissatisfaction with Western economic and political systems, which had all but failed
the many African nations that had turned to liberalism during decolonization. Nonetheless,
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although Africa seemed to be in an ideal position to adopt the Chinese “model”, very few
countries did. Moreover, the countries that did attempt to emulate China’s political ideas
(Tanzania and Mali) quickly failed. This failure was caused firstly by a general lack of interest
on the part of African peoples in the Chinese model and secondly by a lack of interest on the part
of Chinese leaders in helping African countries implement that model. Essentially, for China,
although it had opened up to the world and its ideas received more attention, economic concerns
still overrode any desire to spread political ideas.116
As China’s attempts to broadcast its political ideas floundered, its domestic policies only
further diminished China’s fledging international cultural presence. The most infamous of these
policies was its hard crackdown on student protesters during the Tiananmen Square Massacre in
1989. These protests had manifested for a culmination of reasons—economic slowdown,
demands for greater freedoms, etc.—and, while the aims of the protesters were at times
ambiguous, the response of the government was not. After weeks of demonstrations and hunger
strikes, the CCP would have no more of the protests. Soldiers were sent to the square on June 3rd
with permission to fire, and by the next day hundreds had died and thousands had been
injured.117 This slaughter brought immediate condemnation from the international community,
and international audiences were bombarded with violent images captured by Western
reporters.118 This delegitimized both China and Communism in the eyes of many international
observers.119 While no incident has been as serious as this grotesque violation of human rights,
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China’s policies of the 21st century have fumbled its reputation in other ways. Whether through
foreign labor exploitation, the crackdown of artists like Ai Wei Wei, or the mistreatment of
minorities, namely Tibetans and Uighurs in China’s western provinces, China has repeatedly
sacrificed its international reputation for domestic security.120
Otherwise, speaking to China’s ability to spread what is colloquially referred to as
culture—“(a) observable artifacts, (b) values, and (c) basic underlying assumptions,”—China has
been for the most part successful.121 It is, of course, difficult (if not foolish) to attribute this
success directly to the efforts of China’s leaders. Chinese migrants have set up various
communities all over the globe, Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, all major influencers of
Chinese cultural values and underlying assumptions, have spread internationally, and historic
symbols of Chinese civilization (e.g. the Great Wall) are well-known. None of these
developments can be attributed to CCP leaders, so China’s cultural standing in this stance is
relatively divorced from the PRC’s control. However, Chinese leaders have found ways to
reinforce or create these cultural ties through the widespread promotion of the Confucian
Institute. With its first location established in Uzbekistan in 2004, the Confucius Institute was
created with a rather nebulous mission of spreading Chinese language and culture. Each
institution is generously funded by the Chinese government and holds Chinese language courses
for local populations. These courses, while mainly language instruction, preach pro-CCP views
and introduce general topics of Chinese diaspora to students. When assessing these institutes'
ability to win over local populations, they appear to be effective. Empirical studies suggest a
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positive correlation between the presence of one of these institutes and local media’s positive
portrayal of Chinese politics, meaning China’s cultural projection programs have tangible
results.122 It is important to note that the Confucius Institutes are often associated with Xi
Jinping’s conception of the Chinese Dream, which is vaguely defined as “national prosperity, the
revitalization of the nation and people’s happiness.” This association reflects the CCP’s belief
that winning over foreign populations culturally is important to achieving the goals of the
Chinese Dream, which are described in “the light of the miseries brought to China by Western
powers during the Century of Humiliation.”123
When compared to its other axes of power, the growth of China’s cultural axis of power
seems rather limited. It would be incorrect, however, to suggest China has not grown in cultural
power since 1949. China has made waves with its introduction of a potentially viable alternative
to the American model, even if no other country has successfully adopted the Chinese model yet.
Furthermore, China’s cultural broadcasting has made Chinese culture more visible in
international communities, garnering the PRC some favor among local populations. Whether
these limited successes will be able to outweigh the historic devaluation of China’s reputation,
which, if China cannot successfully ward off neocolonialist labels (discussed in greater length
below), is bound to worsen, is yet to be seen.
The Current Debate
As shown above, China’s military, economic, political, and cultural axes have clearly
become stronger since 1949. However, the culmination of these historical developments has left
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China in an ambiguous position, and its status as a superpower is still unclear. Indeed, as was the
case during Japan’s economic rise in the 1980s, scholars continue to debate the current state of
China’s power. Can China’s economy continue to legitimize the government? Will China
integrate into global institutions or continue to invent its own? To contextualize these questions,
the following section explores current scholarship surrounding the china-as-superpower debate.
Ultimately, the current debate surrounding China’s future as a superpower reinforces the
historical assessment of China’s rise above: although Chinese military, economic, political, and
cultural power may be rising, China still must overcome existing structural hurdles within each
axis before it can become a superpower.
Economy
While all four axes are essential to a superpower, current debates surrounding China’s
rise tend to focus on China’s economic power. For example, in his article, The Inevitable
Superpower: Why China's Dominance Is a Sure Thing, Indian economist Arvind Subramanian
argues that China’s economy will surpass that of the United States as early as 2030. Subramanian
suggests that China’s strong economic growth, its positive balance of trade, and its status as a
“net creditor to the rest of the world” allow China to leverage political benefits out of its
numerous debtors.124 Meanwhile, economic scholars like Derek Scissors reject such unqualified
confidence in China’s rise. In fact, Scissors marks China’s status as a net creditor as a creation of
“its weaknesses, not its strengths.”125 Following Scissors’ logic, China’s closed economic system
prevents the state from importing capital, which would speed its domestic development.126
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Overall, Scissors seems to doubt Subramanian’s prediction of nearly indefinite growth for the
Chinese economy.
This debate reflects the deeper uncertainty that surrounds the future of China’s economy.
Indeed, China’s growth has been spectacular, but scholars from the Institute for International
Economics and the Center for International and Strategic Studies take a more measured
perspective on China’s success. In their joint publication, China: The Balance Sheet, these policy
analysts note five sources of China’s economic power—“the embrace of market forces, the
opening of the economy to trade and inward direct investment, high levels of savings and
investment, the structural transformation of the labor force, and investments in primary
education”—and three hurdles to economic growth—reforming state-owned enterprises,
developing a more efficient capital allocation, and moderating market fluctuations.127 Moreover,
these are only some of the hurdles the economy faces. In the coming decades, China will have to
deal with demographic implications of the one-child policy, the environmental toll of rampant
pollution, and the challenge of switching from a savings country to a consumer country.128 While
these obstacles are surmountable, they suggest China’s economic rise is not preordained.
While economics are understandably at the forefront of this debate, excluding any
discussion of China’s military capabilities, its political influence, and its cultural power leaves a
large gap in the China-as-superpower discussion. International scholars like Rosemary Foot and
Andrew Walter provide a fuller description of the sources of China's growing international
power by noting China’s military and political power along with its economic power.
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Contextualizing their analysis in the larger scholarly debate shows that while Chinese military
and economic power are essential to China’s rise, political and cultural power are also vital to
China’s rise as a superpower.
Military
Starting with China’s military, Foot and Walter describe China’s impressive military
growth over the past decades. China is “a nuclear weapons state” with a rapidly growing army
and navy. In fact, while its defense budget is still dwarfed by that of the United States, “over the
period 1998–2007, China’s military spending in real terms has been estimated to have increased
by 202 percent.”129 More recent statistics show that this trend has continued as China has
increased military spending by 83% between 2009 and 2018, with a planned rise of 7.5% in
military expenditures for 2019.130 This dramatic increase in military spending has led to the
expansion and advancement of China’s military. While all of the People’s Liberation Army’s
developments cannot be noted here, their development of aircraft carriers, satellite-weaponry,
and cyber warfare techniques are notable measures of the PLA’s technological growth.131
Considerable advancements to the military structure initiated by Xi Jinping in 2015, and
described in detail by a report from the Department of Defense similarly suggest a dramatic
increase in China’s military power.132 Moreover, China has increasingly shown a willingness to
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use its military power aggressively. For example, the Chinese government continues to threaten
its neighbors into giving up strategically and politically advantageous positions in the South
China Sea like the Spratly Islands. It does this through the construction of military facilities (and
the islands beneath those facilities), the encirclement of opposing states’ islands, and threats to
fishing boats.133 Even in the face of American opposition, China has asserted its military
authority over the South China Sea, highlighting its growing military power and its willingness
to use that power.134
Although these developments are impressive, other scholars argue that it is rash to
suggest China’s military is on its way to becoming the most powerful in the world. John G.
Ikenberry, for example, notes that when compared to the United States’ and its “Western” allies’,
China’s defense budget is relatively small. Ikenberry includes the sum of the OECD's military
expenditure because he sees the West’s highly integrated military alliances as China’s collective
military opposition. Even when compared to just the United States, the Chinese military is
limited in both its technology and spending power.135 Such a comparison is crucial since, if
China is to achieve some of its long proclaimed goals of reclaiming Taiwan, it will have to
challenge the military authority of the United States (notwithstanding an unlikely abandonment
of Taiwan on the part of the United States).
Politics
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In relation to political power, Foot and Walter note that China “has permanent UN
Security Council membership and a growing development aid budget.”136 These factors have
greatly contributed to China’s political power within international politics, allowing the PRC
much greater leverage over the UN’s mission as well as the allocation of development funds.137
Beyond the United Nations, as mentioned above, China’s ascension to the World Trade
Organization in 2001 has brought China greater economic protections and influence in global
markets.138 Indeed, some scholars like G. John Ikenberry and Darren J. Lim, international
relations analysists writing in the Project on International Order and Strategy for the Brookings
Institute, even suggest that China stands a chance at supplanting America’s long-standing seat at
the top of the international order. As a matter of fact, these scholars argue that China’s chances at
overtaking the existing international political order either through existing institutions or new
institutions are only improved by the Trump administration’s unwillingness to maintain
international order through institutional commitment.139
While these scholars are right to note China’s growing institutional power, their
assessments may be overblown. For instance, although China contributes significantly to
International Financial Institutions like the WTO, it is yet to be determined as to whether such
multilateral participation will significantly elevate China’s political power.140 Indeed, recent
developments have undermined China’s authority in the WTO, and the issue of intellectual
property rights will most likely remain a point of contention between China and other WTO
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members. These developments are not merely a political hiccup either. The WTO’s repeated
denial of China’s ascension to market-economy status has seriously hamstrung China’s
economy. This is primarily because market status would unambiguously illegitimate American
tariffs against Chinese goods. While the exact impact of the “Trade War” is yet to be seen, early
reports indicate that the Chinese economy is suffering far more than American economy (with
the exception of the American soy market).141 For this reason, China’s status within the WTO,
and in many international political institutions, is far from trivial. While Foot and Walter gloss
over this issue, Ikenberry and Lim describe the daunting task China faces in more realistic terms.
They write:
China’s ability to wield new institutions as “instruments” of its political and economic goals has limits.
Moreover, as the existing institutional order has rules and institutions that China can use to pursue and
defend its interests (particularly those relating to sovereignty norms), China’s struggle to gain advantage
and voice may draw it further into the existing system. 142

Essentially, China is in an awkward position. The more it may attempt to assert itself into the
global order, the more it may be drawn into that system and changed by its rules, rather than
changing the rules themselves. Thus, although China is certainly in a position to gain political
power, the deep institutionalization of the existing order may be too stable to topple.
Culture
Although Foot and Walter discuss military, economic, and political power at length, they
leave China’s cultural axis of power out of the discussion. Does China have the cultural “soft
power” of a superpower? In The Beijing Consensus: Legitimizing Authoritarianism in Our Time,
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American foreign policy scholar Stefan Halper claims that “China is the protagonist in a clash of
values, governance, and two versions of modernity in the twenty-first century.”143 While this is
vaguely reminiscent of a Huntington-esque “Clash of Civilizations” argument, Halper zeros in
on the two ideational models the United States and China represent: liberal democracy and
market authoritarianism. While liberal democracy is a merger of free-market capitalism and
representative government, “market authoritarianism,” is made of “a liberal economic policy that
opens the economy” and “the persistence of authoritarian rule, which allows the ruling party to
keep a firm grip on government, the courts, the military, and the flow of information.”144
Although, as Jeffery Legro suggests, China is not explicitly pushing this governing system on
other nations the way the United States does through the IFIs (i.e. the “Washington Consensus”),
it is certainly trying to garner support for this political system through extensive narrative
dissemination.145 For example, “Beijing invested $6.8 billion in 2010 to create a global network
with daily news and commentary in fifty-six languages on television, on radio, and in print,”
with the purpose “to frame developing stories in a China-friendly way.”146 Such advertising
campaigns are bolstered by comprehensive language and culture programs like the Confucius
Institute, which, as mentioned above, are sites charged with the general purpose of spreading
Chinese language and culture. Consequently, Confucius Institutes have become one of the many
ways in which the PRC attempts to extend its cultural component of “soft power”.147
Other scholars approach claims of a “Beijing Consensus” more cautiously. Mark Beeson
and Fujian Li challenge the notion of China’s growing ideational power in their piece What
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Consensus? Geopolitics and Policy Paradigms in China and the United States. Beeson and Li
argue that despite China’s impressive growth, it is overzealous to claim China offers a model for
other developing nations to emulate.148 This is because the “Sino-Capitalist” model lacks “a
clearly articulated set of core principles” which “has given it significantly less traction as a
distinct discourse or policy paradigm” compared to America’s ten, clearly outlined economic
principles enshrined in the Washington Consensus.149 This essentially means that despite the
active cultural programs Halper notes, China will continue to struggle to export its marketauthoritarian “model” to other states, thereby limiting its global ideational power. Such a barrier
is only compounded by the negative reputation the PRC is accumulating abroad through its
strategic and economic maneuvers. For instance, as China funds ambitious economic projects in
countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America, “China is continually
having to fend off accusations of ‘neo-colonialism’.”150 Whether this animosity comes from
evidence of corruption and poor planning (Ecuador), dangerous working conditions and racist
Chinese managers (Zambia), or predatory lending practices (Sri Lanka), China’s economic
ambition abroad has certainly engendered negative feelings among foreign populations, if not
foreign leaders.151 Additionally, China’s exceptionally aggressive behavior in the South China
Sea has only undermined the PRC’s claims of non-interference, thus pushing its neighbors closer
into the sphere of American influence.152 Clearly, in relation to cultural power, China likewise
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has difficult ideational and reputational hurdles to overcome. Thus, when joining these cultural
observations with Foot and Walter’s analysis, existing scholarship suggests that if China is on its
way to becoming a superpower, it certainly has numerous hurdles to overcome before that
happens.
Does this scholarship reflect reality? Certainly, China is a powerful state, but does it have
the military capacity to challenge the United States? Is its economy on its way to overcoming
America’s? Does China’s institutional power, combined with its “soft” cultural power, amount to
a “Beijing Consensus” capable of rivaling the “Washington Consensus”? In reality, the questions
can only be answered by time. At this present moment, however, it is clear that China seeks to
overcome these deficits in its axes of power. Especially in relation to economics, the Belt and
Road Initiative seems to be China’s primary solution. While this paper cannot address the full
extent of the BRI in Latin America, a brief introduction is sufficient enough to demonstrate
China’s general goals in Latin America.
What is the Belt and Road Initiative?
Announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013, the BRI is a massive infrastructure project
that seeks to revitalize the historic Silk Road and extend Chinese influence throughout the world.
During his speech, Xi proclaimed the Chinese government would “build the Belt and Road into a
road of opening up” not just on the Asian continent, but to all the world.153 Although Xi relies
rhetorically on the long history of the Silk Road, the BRI is hardly restricted to the Silk Road’s
original trade routes. In fact, Xi notes that “all countries, from either Asia, Europe, Africa or the
Americas, can be international cooperation partners of the Belt and Road Initiative.” This is
important to note since an overwhelming majority of the maps depicting the Belt and Road
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Initiative only trace paths between Eurasia and Africa.154 Since its conception in 2013, the BRI
has funded enormous infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, and Ethiopia, to
name a few. Importantly, these funds are said to come without the reforms that an organization
like the IMF would request in return, such as economic liberalization. Despite these claims,
nations participating in the BRI have quickly become aware of the informal strings attached to
inviting the construction of a BRI project: the projects are built and overwhelmingly employed
by Chinese workers, not local workers, and states that default on their loans either relinquish the
project to Chinese control (Sri Lanka signed away its massive port in Hambantota for 99 years)
or are cornered into making special payment deals (such as allowing payment in oil, which China
desperately needs).155 While these reputational hurdles have slowed the BRI, countries continue
to take on Chinese investment despite stories of predatory loans.156
What hurdles does it (and does it not) attempt to address? Relying on the definition of
superpower used throughout this research, it seems clear that, although China has no explicit
desire to degrade its political and cultural axes of power, China’s economic needs supersede any
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opportunities to strengthen its other axes of power. This is most likely because of the CCP’s
heavy dependence on economic growth for stability, which is often labeled “output
legitimacy.”157 If China loses cultural or political authority through hostile BRI practices, it may
descend somewhat in its international standing, but the risk of an economic crisis that could
delegitimize the CCP is far more dangerous. For this reason, China has used the BRI as a means
of tackling its largest economic concerns of the 21st Century—energy, food dependency, and
unemployment—despite these political and cultural risks.158 This disregard has come at a great
cost for the people of Latin America, and BRI projects are quickly ravaging the environment,
and exacerbating preexisting social issues in Latin America, such as conflict over indigenous
land in Nicaragua.

Conclusion
Finally, returning to the original question, is China a superpower? At the current moment,
China’s history suggests that, while China’s historical trajectory suggests it may be on a path
towards becoming a superpower, it has not yet strengthened its axes to the level of a superpower.
This “could be but is not” position is well reflected in the heated debates of scholarly literature,
which is comprised of small spars over whether one axis of power really is strong or not. Perhaps
the most unpredictable component of China’s rise is the Belt and Road Initiative, which has
served to both help and hurt China’s power. Independent of China’s rise, however, is the
growing concern about China’s policies and their impact on the world. Will the BRI accelerate
climate change? Does China’s rise necessitate a Thucydides Trap scenario with the United
States? Will Chinese operations abroad be remembered as the neocolonialism of the 21st
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Century? While these questions cannot be addressed here, they must be considered if the world is
to avoid the grievous consequences of a superpower conflict.
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